The situation
The estate had grown the way estates grow: by addition. Monoliths on virtual machines beside containerised services, several physical data centres, and a load curve the hardware had stopped keeping up with.
Downtime was the binding constraint rather than the technical difficulty. A betting platform's busiest hour is scheduled by somebody else, and it is the same hour the business earns in — so each move had to be invisible to users and reversible while it was happening.
We were brought in alongside the client's own DevOps and IT groups: ordering the queue, choosing the strategy per application and doing the work, rather than handing over a plan for someone else to run.
Solution
01A landing zone before a single workload
Nothing moved until the account structure existed: separate Development, Pre-production and Production accounts, with access and security policy set at the boundary rather than per application.
This is the part that is tempting to skip under schedule pressure and the most expensive to retrofit. An account layout is a decision every later workload inherits whether or not anyone revisits it.
02A hybrid network, so the cutover was not also a bandwidth problem
AWS Direct Connect carried traffic between the data centres and the new accounts for the length of the programme. Moving the data over the public internet would have made every cutover window depend on a number nobody controls.
It also let an application run with its data on one side and its compute on the other for as long as it needed, which is what made moving one application at a time possible at all.
03One application at a time, least critical first
The queue was ordered by blast radius rather than by effort. The early moves were the ones where a mistake was survivable, so the pattern was found on those and not on the payment path.
Each application got its own strategy. Some were rehosted unchanged, which freed physical capacity fastest and brought the data-centre exit forward. Some were replatformed onto managed services where the change paid for itself within the programme rather than in principle.
04Retiring counted as progress
The inventory found that roughly 15% of the legacy applications were not worth moving: their function had been absorbed elsewhere, or nobody could name a user. Those were retired or replaced rather than lifted.
This is the cheapest work in any migration and the easiest to skip, because switching something off does not look like progress on a migration plan. It was counted as progress here, which is the only reason it happened at that scale.
05A proof of concept before the contested decisions
Where the right shape was genuinely arguable, a throwaway environment settled it: stand the option up, check it against the on-premise systems it had to interoperate with, then decide.
A proof of concept is slower than a decision taken in a meeting. It is also the reason there was no architecture reversal part-way through the programme.
06Canary cutovers, approved by somebody other than us
Traffic moved to the new infrastructure gradually rather than at a switch. That gave a window in which the new path could be watched under real load, and an exit that did not need a maintenance night.
Every stage was approved by the client's own security and architecture board before it ran. An outside team moving 500 applications through somebody else's estate should not be the only party deciding what is safe to do next.
Outcome
- 500+
- applications moved, one at a time
- 15%
- retired or replaced instead of moved
- 22%
- ahead of the migration plan
- Estate in cloud at the end
- More than 80% of capacity
- Cutover method
- Canary, traffic shifted gradually
- Approval
- Client's security and architecture board, per stage
- Network during the programme
- AWS Direct Connect to the data centres
The plan was beaten by 22%, and more than 80% of the company's capacity now runs in the cloud. Peak load during live fixtures is absorbed by autoscaling rather than by hardware bought for the worst hour of the year, and a new environment is a provisioning step instead of a procurement one.
The client reports infrastructure costs down by roughly 80%, in the region of $800,000. That figure is theirs rather than ours: it covers the whole estate across the whole programme, and a large part of it is the applications that were retired rather than moved. We have not reconciled it the way we reconcile a saving in an audit, so it appears here with its basis attached rather than as a headline.
The remaining fraction stayed on-premise. That was a commercial decision rather than a technical one, and a migration case study that implies the data centres emptied completely would be describing a different programme.